Obstacles to transparency over pharmacovigilance data within the EMA

Abstract

In July and August 2014, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) organised two public consultations concerning European pharmacovigilance. These two consultations reveal a number of EMA proposals that are counterproductive to the objective of improving transparency over pharmacovigilance data.

The EMA’s proposals offer pharmaceutical companies an opportunity to participate in public hearings held by the European Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC), in order to defend their drug. They also provide for the possibility of holding non-public hearings to discuss public data. There is a great risk that the drug industry might use these provisions to influence the debate.

The strings attached to the access that the EMA proposes to grant researchers to data contained in the centralised European pharmacovigilance database would allow the EMA to censor the publication of their findings. The EMA seems to regard pharmacovigilance data as commercially confidential information.

Responding to these consultations provided an opportunity to remind the EMA that data about adverse effects are a public good, in the common interest, and that it is unacceptable to keep this information confidential.

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ments about the need to protect intel-
lectual property have appeared, such as the responsibility to apply “appropri-
ate technical and organisational measures to protect information and personal data (…) against unauthorised or unlawful access, disclosure, dissemination, alteration, or destruction or accidental loss” (4).

This wording, which resembles the title of the proposal for a European directive on “trade secrets” currently under review by the European Parlia-
ment, reveals that the EMA now seems to regard pharmacovigilance data as commercially confidential information or even “trade secrets”, and has taken on board the pharmaco-
tical industry’s willingness to control these data and their dissemina-
tion (6,8,9).

In summary: erosion of transpare-
cy. These two consultations reveal that the EMA’s approach to transparen-
cy over pharmacovigilance data is even more timid than its approach to clinical trial results (7). The final versions the EMA adopts for its rules of procedure on the organisation and conduct of public hearings and for its policy on access to pharmacovigilance data will need to be examined carefully. We will continue to monitor the situation.

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Pay for performance: financial rewards without improving quality of care

Pay-for-performance systems offer healthcare professionals financial incentives intended to support public health initiatives, to reduce health care spending, or to apply “best” practices (1). Yet according to various analyses, pay-for-performance programmes yield mixed and often disappointing results (2,3). The effects of one such programme involving benzodiazepine prescribing in France show that the reality can be complex.

Reduced benzodiazepine use? In 2009, one of the objectives of the French National Health Insurance Fund’s pay-for-performance programme “CAPI” (Contracts for Improved Individual Practice) was to reduce the proportion of persons aged over 65 years taking long half-life benzodiazepines to less than 5%. A reduction in the duration of benzodi-
azepine treatment would have been a more relevant measure for patients, however (4). In 2011, the “ROSP” programme (Payment for Public Health Objectives), which replaced the CAPI programme, addressed this issue by encouraging prescribers to limit benzodiazepine treatment to less than 12 weeks (5,6).

In a report on the ROSP programme published in 2013, the National Health Insurance Fund congratulated itself on a reduction in the proportion of persons aged over 65 years taking long half-life benzodiazepines from 13.7% in late 2011 to 10.8% in late 2014 (5). How-
ever, the programme failed to reduce the proportion of patients newly treated with benzodiazepines who continued treatment for more than 12 weeks: this proportion remained unchanged in 2014, at about 15%.

Counterproductive. The results of a study conducted in the Pays de la Loire region of France may explain this phenomenon. The reduction in the proportion of prescriptions for long half-life benzodiazepines between 2011 and 2012 was associated with an increase in prescriptions for short half-life benzodiazepines (7). And a greater proportion of patients over the age of 65 years who were prescribed short half-life benzodiazepines continued treatment for more than 12 weeks compared with those who were pre-
scribed long half-life benzodiazepines. This seems “counterproductive”.

This pay-for-performance programme therefore altered benzodiaz-
epine prescribing patterns without leading to any real improvement in the quality of health care. Protecting patients from adverse effects requires more than payments for meeting mea-
surable performance targets.

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